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Abstract: Southeast Asia is of highest geostrategic interest for China as a
rising Great Power as well as for the U.S. and its ally Japan. Since the “Pivot
to East Asia” of the Obama administration in Washington in 2011 observers
are discussing a “New Great Game” in the region. But has China already
established a “backyard” by its economic activities in Southeast Asia and in
particular in ASEAN countries? What is the spatial pattern of China’s activ-
ities? As an analysis of FDI stocks as well as trade related data show ASEAN
countries can be divided into several groups. (1) China’s small neighbour
Laos dominated by Chinese FDI. (2) Countries like Cambodia and Myanmar
partly dominated by Chinese FDI. (3) Countries with different trade ties to
China but mostly strong military or diplomatic ties to the U.S. like Singapore,
the Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and (4) the inde-
pendent Brunei Darussalam. Therefore, Southeast Asia and in particular
ASEAN cannot be called a Chinese “backyard” yet. But if U.S. president
Trump withdraws the U.S. attention from the region China could be able to
achieve a hegemonic position in the region soon.
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1 Introduction
Southeast Asia is located at the crossover between South Asia and East Asia.
Traditionally, it is considered by the U.S., China, India, and Japan as their
respective sphere of influence. Currently, a new pattern of power is emerging
in this region because of the rise of China. Maritime territorial claims of China in
the South China Sea are well known. But this is only one of several develop-
ments in the region caused by the economic and political rise of this country.
For a few years, ties between China and its southern neighbours have been
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getting closer and closer, both economically and politically. As early as in 2010,
the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA) came in force. And as part of the ‘Go-
out’ strategy under the 12th Five-Year-Plan (2011–2015), President Xi Jinping in
2013 proposed to make efforts with countries in Southeast Asia to create a new
“maritime silk road” as part of the “One Belt, One Road” project, nowadays better
known as China’s “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI). This twenty-first Century
Maritime Silk Road is focussing on ASEAN countries reaching India, Sri Lanka
and East Africa via the Strait of Malacca.1 Two years later, China established the
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) focussing on the improvement of
infrastructure as well as other productive sectors in Asia. All these Chinese
activities in Southeast Asia can be interpreted as resources-driven, emphasising
China’s possibility to increase in imports of raw materials and, in particular, of
energy.2 On the other hand, both the maritime silk road and the AIIB are
obviously aimed to ty China’s economy closer to those of its neighbours in
Southeast Asia. As Mazza (2015) pointed out: “China here aims not only to
accrue economic benefits, but to expand its economic penetration of Southeast
Asia, with associated increases in influence and power.”3
Early in 2011, the Obama administration declared an U.S. “Pivot to East
Asia”, changing its regional focus from the Middle East to East Asia. The
main purpose was to re-balance power in this region because of the fast
development of China.4 It seems that in Southeast Asia a new “Great Game”
between the People’s Republic of China and the U.S. involving several other
smaller “players” like Japan, India or Thailand has just started. Therefore, the
main research questions of this paper are: Has China already established a
“backyard”, a sphere of influence, by its economic activities in ASEAN? In
other words, was China even able to push the U.S. out of Southeast Asia as
Friedberg (2012) has asked? Or do we have to talk about “two hierarchies” in
the region following Ikenberry (2015) who postulated a security hierarchy in
Southeast Asia dominated by the United States and an economic hierarchy
dominated by China. In both cases, what is the spatial pattern of China’s
activities in ASEAN? The main hypotheses of this paper are that China has
not succeeded to establish a backyard in Southeast Asia yet and that the
theory of dual hierarchy does not fully explain the current pattern of Chinese
and the US influence in Southeast Asia respectively. Rather this pattern is
much more diverse.
1 Garcia-Herrero et al. 2015: 10.
2 Truong 2015: 126.
3 Mazza 2015.
4 Evans 2013.
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We will choose a geopolitical approach to analyse the behaviour of the
Chinese government and its competitors in ASEAN countries, focussing on back-
yard theory as well as on Ikenberry’s (2015) two hierarchies. This framework
allows for analysing mainly economic, but also military activities of the Chinese
government and its competitors. Thus, in a first step the geopolitical actors in
the region will be identified and their main interests in ASEAN specified. As can
be shown easily, the main actors are the world powers U.S. and China. Besides,
also regional powers like India or Japan are playing relevant roles. In a second
step, we will present an empirical analysis of the economic dependence of
ASEAN countries on China, focussing on Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) in
the region and trade relations. By this way, we will depict a spatial pattern of the
rise of China’s mainly economic power in ASEAN. Finally, this pattern and its
development will be explained in more detail from a geopolitical point of view,
also showing trends for the future. In this final section we will draw a distinction
between countries (partly) dominated by Chinese FDI and independent countries
with different trade ties to China.
2 Geopolitics in Southeast Asia
2.1 Geopolitics and geopolitical competitors: A theoretical
framework
Geopolitics studies the effects of human and physical geography on interna-
tional politics and especially on international relations.5 In this, it focuses on
political power investigating diplomatic history in relation to geographic space,
especially water ways, trade routes, access to natural resources etc. Therefore,
beside politics and international relations, it also takes into account economic
and social factors.6 The idea of geopolitics harkens back to the end of the
nineteenth century. This “classical geopolitics” – mainly influenced by
Friedrich Ratzel (1897/1974) – focusses on the spatial growth of states from a
point of view of Social Darwinism. At that time, the distinction of land and sea
power was introduced. Already Mahan (1890) explained how sea powers like the
U.S. or Japan try to control sea lines in order to maintain or improve their
“maritime power”, while Mackinder (1904/1967) analysed the trend from sea
powers to land powers concerning the decline of the British Empire. Later,
5 Devetak et al. 2012: 492.
6 Heydarian 2016: 157.
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Spykman’s (1942) idea of the importance of the so-called “Rimland” (Europe and
Southeast Asia) in contrast to “Heartland” (Eurasia) and “balance of power”
influenced the politics of the rising US. With the Cold War, new geopolitical
approaches like “containment”, “domino theory” or “balance of power linkages”
were introduced.7 A lot of these terms can be applied to the current situation in
Southeast Asia, too. See Parry (2014) on sea power, for instance. In contrast,
“critical geopolitics” as new approach evolved in the 1970s. Its main goal was to
unveil ideology and invisible assumptions of the traditional geopolitics to show
the mechanisms of power.8 Nowadays, geopolitics is supplemented by the term
“geoeconomics”. As Luttwak (1990) has pointed out early, the importance of
military power was giving way to economic power after the end of Cold War.
Following Keohane/Nye (1977) “asymmetrical interdependence” in economic
relations can be a source of power while they define economic power as “control
over resources, or the potential to affect outcomes”.9 This asymmetry also
evolved between China and ASEAN member countries during the last decade.10
ASEAN is a diverse region with immense social, cultural and economic
differences. States vary from small in terms of population but rich in GDP (e. g.
Brunei Darussalam) to quite poor but very large like the hugest Muslim country of
the world, Indonesia.11 Therefore, ASEAN is a non-consolidated group of disparate
states, although in the past fifty years they were quite successful in establishing
economic links among themselves.12 As a consequence, ASEAN itself cannot be
regarded as a geopolitical player in the “Great Game” for Southeast Asia.
Accordingly, particularly China and the U.S. are the main geopolitical players in
the region. Southeast Asia is located close to China, a rising political and eco-
nomic power, which accelerated military modernisation. At the same time, the
region traditionally has strong ties to the U.S. But the financial and economic
crisis in 2008 undermined the foundations of U.S. economic and military power
and provided a unique strategic opportunity for China in Southeast Asia.13 While
the U.S. as a global super power can’t maintain sole leadership of the region,
China’s economic rise has shifted the political balance. But the U.S. is not waiting
to be degraded to some sub-primacy in Southeast Asia as an outcome of what
some authors have called Chinese “domination by stealth”.14 Other observers see
7 O’Sullivan 1982.
8 See e. g. Ó Tuathail 1996.
9 Keohane/Nye 1977: 10.
10 Oh 2017: 1.
11 World Bank 2016.
12 Wood 2015: 112.
13 Heydarian 2016: 166.
14 Majid 2012: 27.
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this as a transition of power in Southeast Asia. The basic “power transition
theory” predicts even conflicts when the rising power’s aggregate power becomes
close to that of the predominant power.15 But it is questionable if China at the
moment can be seen as a rising power able to challenge the U.S. either worldwide
or in Southeast Asia.
For Great Powers like China or the U.S. the main geopolitical goal in
Southeast Asia may be expected to be the establishment or maintenance of a
backyard in this region, respectively. In allusion to the competition between
Russia and the British Empire for Central Asia in the nineteenth century, we can
call this a new “Great Game”. The principles of a “backyard” or “primacy of
power” have been formulated by scientists of the U.S. think tank, the Rand
Corporation, already decades ago. According to Ronfeld (1983), a primacy of one
power can be described as a situation based on four principles: First, a region
must be secure for the power’s “presence, power, and passage”; second, “hostile
foreign powers must be prevented from acquiring military bases and facilities
there”; third, “foreign balance-of-power struggles must be excluded and pre-
vented from destabilising the region”; and fourth, only a few military resources
“have to be dedicated to protecting interests and assets there”.16 Several authors
have already applied this approach in one way or another to Central Asia,17 but
also to China’s policy towards Southeast Asia.18
Although China is not a challenging new super power, a shift of power in
Southeast Asia has to be acknowledged. As Ikenberry (2015) pointed out:
The United States remains the leading hegemonic power in Asia, but hegemonic leadership
is eroding and fragmenting in various ways. A power transition is under way in the region.
China is a rising state that will increasingly have capacities for hegemonic leadership19
This shift of power will lead to a “grand geopolitical adjustment process”.20
Therefore, he sees East Asia characterised by the development of a dual hierarchy
of a U.S. dominated security system and a Chinese dominated trade system.
But political, military and economic relations in Southeast Asia are more
complicated. First, economic ties are not only trade ties but also relations of FDI
and developmental aid. As McGowan/Smith (1978) in their basic work on
dependency theory of underdevelopment have pointed out “economic power
15 Shambaugh 2016: 146.
16 Ronfeld 1983: 5.
17 See e. g. Kleveman 2004, Cooley 2012, or Wrobel 2014.
18 See e. g. Glosny 2007.
19 Ikenberry 2015: 8.
20 Ikenberry 2015: 8.
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dependency” can be measured by several variables, mainly (1) percentages of
aid from the major donor, (2) percentages of exports going to the most important
trading partner, and (3) percentages of FDI coming from the major investing
country. While “dependency theorists” tried to explain neo-colonialist exploita-
tion of the developing countries by developed ones in an ideological way, their
criteria still lend themselves for an analysis of economic dependency also
today.21 Therefore, I follow Das (2017) or Oh (2017) in choosing the two most
important factors, FDI and trade ties, for the explanation of economic depen-
dency in a modified way. I preferably use data from international organizations
like UNCTAD (2016, 2017) or the World Bank (2016), but also from ASEAN (2015,
2016a, 2016b, 2016c, 2017), the Chinese Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM 2016)
and the CIA (2016) to get a complete set of data for 2015. Unfortunately, the third
important economic dimension – developmental aid and loans – can’t be taken
into consideration because China does not publish detailed data of its foreign
aid programmes.22 Since the concrete definition of dependency is fuzzy, I define
my own percentages as indicators of dependency when focussing mainly on
relative disparities in the region.
Second, beside China and the U.S. second level players in the “Great Game”
in Southeast Asia have to be acknowledged: first of all, Japan is an important
source of FDI in the region with ambitious plans for infrastructure investment,
too. Additionally, the Japanese government has signed so-called strategic part-
nership agreements on maritime security with Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia,
and the Philippines.23 Also India has implemented a so-called “Look East”
policy in the early 1990s. Drivers were economic needs, as well as political
expediency after the end of the Cold War. In particular, India has increased its
competition with China for Myanmar’s significant oil and gas reserves.24
Furthermore, India is expanding strategically from the Indian Ocean into the
South China Sea because it wants to become an Asian power, not just an Indian
Ocean actor, also balancing China in the Far East.25 Finally, the governments of
Thailand and Vietnam also acted as local hegemony powers in Indochina in the
past.26 Nowadays, they are important trade partners for several other Southeast
Asian countries. Overall, there are two main groups of players in the game: on
the one hand China wants to establish a backyard or at least an economic
21 For a discussion see e. g. Huang/Słomczyński 2003/2004.
22 Saunders 2016: 371.
23 Mazza 2015.
24 Naidu 2013: 64–67.
25 Zhao 2014: 16.
26 Guan 2012: 38.
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dominance in the region. On the other hand, its main competitors, Japan, India
and particularly the U.S. want to balance China’s rise and political ambitions.
2.2 China’s strategic interests in Southeast Asia
Early at the beginning of the fifteenth century the Chinese Yongle emperor sent
navigator Zheng He on a naval expedition to Southeast Asia, India and East
Africa. Nevertheless, China remained a land power for centuries. At the same
time, Southeast Asia’s economies are traditionally dominated by Chinese because
of emigration. Most of the ancestors of current Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia
were immigrating from Guangdong and Fujian provinces in South China into the
neighbouring countries in the South between the sixteenth and nineteenth cen-
tury. Therefore, Southeast Asia has strong traditional cultural as well as economic
relations with China. Nowadays, important minorities exist in Thailand (14%) and
Malaysia (23.4%). Less important are the Chinese minorities in Indonesia,
Myanmar, the Philippines and Vietnam.27
While the Chinese constitute politically vulnerable minorities in the latter
countries, they are nonetheless economically powerful and dominate local
economies or – perhaps – the region as whole. Most of them are descendants
of poor peasant families coming to Southeast Asia from Southeast China – with
the strong motivation typical for voluntary migrants and with the willingness
to invest in education. As a result, they control relatively large modern com-
panies which now dominate much of Southeast Asia’s economy. Therefore, the
host peoples in several non-Chinese societies in Southeast Asia nowadays
often see the Overseas Chinese as a “fifth column” of China’s plans. This is
why anti-Chinese sentiments especially in the Malay world are rather strong.28
Southeast Asia thus is traditionally a Chinese “backyard” in economic terms,
but certainly not one of the People’s Republic of China and its communist
party government. Yet, the attitude of the People’s Republic to the Overseas
Chinese in Southeast Asia has changed dramatically. Nowadays, they consider
the Chinese diaspora as a support on their way to restore China’s status as a
super power which it had for several centuries before western countries over-
took it in the nineteenth century.29
After centuries of neglect, the People’s Republic of China in the early 1990s
established a new strategy of foreign policy. It pursued the “good neighbour
27 CIA 2016.
28 K.S. 2003: 11–20.
29 Tan 2015: 8.
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policy” aiming to turn Southeast Asia into a showcase for a “peaceful rise”
strategy.30 Since then, China became a new active player in the local “Great
Game” with the U.S., the last remaining super power in the region. China also is
investing considerably in becoming a “sea power” like the U.S.31 Therefore,
some writers have already described the immediate neighbours of China, stra-
tegically located along its southern border as “Chinese backyard”.32
Because China is a communist party state, the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP) can be seen as one main player in the new “Great Game” in Southeast
Asia. The CCP has some interest to secure energy supply and markets for
Chinese firms in Southeast Asia to foster the economic rise of the country. The
main goal seems to be the rise of China to a world power. Only then, the ruling
elite, consisting of communist party officials, CEOs of state owned enterprises
(SOEs) and entrepreneurs can maintain power in China and increase their
wealth.33 Of course, the CCP cannot be seen as a monolithic block. For instance,
officials from the Yunnan province have taken a leading role in orienting
economic policy towards the neighbouring countries. But it goes without saying
that their activities are consistent with national strategic and economic objec-
tives.34 On the other hand, we have to assume that SOEs are receiving coordina-
tion and support from the central government.
For the political elite in China, energy security is vital for the further devel-
opment. While China became the worldwide largest energy producer in 2007, it
also became the largest energy consumer of the world in 2010. Therefore, energy
is of highest importance for Chinese growth. But more than 80% of China’s crude
oil imports come from the Middle East or Africa through the Strait of Malacca,
making China depending on the regional powers as well as on the U.S., the main
sea power in Southeast Asia.35 Reducing this dependency must be considered as
one of the main geopolitical goals of the People’s Republic of China. Therefore,
especially Myanmar, situated in mainland Southeast Asia is of highest impor-
tance for China because the country allows China to circumvent the Strait of
Malacca via its oil and gas pipelines. Also, China’s efforts to establish a transport
corridor via Pakistan through the Chinese-operated Gwadar port and the
Karakorum highway, as well as its proposal to finance the Kra Isthmus canal
project through Thailand and Malaysia have to be understood from this
30 Zhao 2014: 1.
31 Zhao 2015a: 171.
32 Guan 2012: 38.
33 Zhao 2015a: 94.
34 Lee 2013a: 9.
35 Wrobel 2014: 24–26.
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geopolitical point of view.36 This also allows for understanding the strategic
interest of China in the Spratley Islands and the Paracelsus Islands in the
South China Sea.37 Control over both archipelagos would simultaneously
improve China’s energy security in two ways: on the one hand, large oil and
gas reserves are expected in the region, and on the other hand, free shipping
routes for Chinese tankers from the Strait of Malacca to the Chinese mainland
would be secured. In this way, rising demand for energy resources gives rise to a
kind of “energy protectionism” or “resource nationalism” in Southeast Asia.38
But Southeast Asia and ASEAN countries in particular are also of interest for
China as markets for its products as well as for its outward foreign direct invest-
ments (OFDI). Thanks to China’s “Go-Out” strategy, the People’s Republic sup-
ports several countries in the region with infrastructure projects. For instance, the
countries of the Greater Mekong sub-region (Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia
and Vietnam) are important to China for developing its southwestern provinces
such as Yunnan. In particular, transportation connections, investment and trade
with the neighbours in Southeast Asia can create a strong boost for economic
development in this region.39 Also, the “Maritime Silk Road of the twenty-first
Century”, the ASEAN-related part of the BRI, has to be understood as a central
issue in China’s new diplomacy focusing on infrastructure projects. Its intention is
to strengthen the Chinese relations with its overseas neighbouring countries
through investments in infrastructure. These projects will be spearheaded by the
new AIIB. The bank will focus on upgrading port infrastructure, as well as
building new infrastructure in the region to satisfy the increasing demand caused
by the evolving maritime trade cooperation. This aims at expanding overseas
markets for Chinese enterprises and developing new bases for those Chinese
sectors with surplus outputs like the iron and steel, and cement industries.40
All in all, China has become the centre of economic activity in East Asia, not
by accident, but by design of the CCP. The Chinese government calls this the
“economic interconnectivity”. While the region can benefit from these develop-
ments – especially from the Chinese infrastructure investments in the frame of
the BRI – observers, as well as ASEAN politicians, also see an increasing
asymmetry and imbalance.41 These imbalances provoke activities of China’s
geopolitical competitors in the region.
36 Phi 2015: 52.
37 See e. g. Kaplan 2012: 188–228.
38 Zhao 2015b: 2.
39 Truong 2015: 188–189.
40 Zhao 2015c: 2–5.
41 Shambaugh 2016: 142.
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2.3 The competitors’ strategic interests in Southeast Asia
In history, Southeast Asia was under the control of Western colonial powers, in
particular the British, French and Dutch. But also for the last remaining super-
power of the world, the U.S., Southeast Asia was and is highest strategic interest.
As the Heritage Foundation points out:
In the subsequent more than 200 years, the United States has worked under the strategic
assumption that it was inimical to American interests to allow any single nation to
dominate Asia. Asia constituted too important a market and was too great a source of
key resources for the United States to be denied access42
In particular, Mao Tse-Tung’s revolutionary communism brought an American
presence in the region that endures till nowadays. During this time, the U.S.
conducted two military interventions: first in Korea, and then later in
Vietnam.43 For the U.S. the loss of China popularised the idea that gains of
communism in Indochina would trigger a domino effect in the region.44 In
view of the raising China, the U.S. administration in Washington today tries to
maintain the U.S. supremacy in the world. Therefore, the Obama administra-
tion declared the U.S. “Pivot to East Asia” in 2011. By the change of the
regional focus from the Middle East to Southeast Asia the balance of power
between China and the U.S. should be maintained obviously containing
China’s rise in the world.
Moreover, Asia for the U.S. is also an important impetus of global economy
including the world’s busiest international sea-lanes and some of the most vital
ports in the world.45 Therefore, the U.S. seeks to preserve a “geographically
distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable regional force
posture” within the U.S. Pacific Command area of responsibility that can effec-
tively discourage any potential antagonist.46 The U.S. key allies are Japan and
the Republic of Korea in Northeast Asia and the Philippines, Thailand, and
Australia in the Southeast. Also, the world’s largest democracy, India, can be
considered as an ally. These strategical alliances are complemented within
ASEAN by very close security relationships with Singapore and developing
relationships with other countries like Vietnam, Malaysia, and Indonesia.47
42 Wood 2015: 111.
43 Cox 2012: 9.
44 Guan 2012: 37.
45 Wood 2015: 121.
46 U.S. Department of State 2012.
47 Wood 2015: 112.
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To secure the U.S. primacy in the Asia – Pacific, including Southeast Asia and
ASEAN, the Obama administration has identified six lines of action: “Strengthening
bilateral security alliances; deepening U.S. relationships with emerging powers;
engaging with regional multilateral institutions; expanding trade and investment;
forging a broad-based military presence; advancing democracy and human right”,
which forms what was called the “Pivot” towards East Asia.48 Also in economic
terms, the U.S. tried to counter balance the rise of China: In February 2016 twelve
states signed the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement, among others Brunei
Darussalam, Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam in Southeast Asia, with the U.S.,
explicitly excluding China. The TPP contained measures to lower both non-tariff
and tariff barriers to trade between the participating countries.49 But the agreement
was left by the U.S. under the Trump administration already a few days after
president Trump’s inauguration. Froma geopolitical point of view this strengthened
the economic position of China in the region while weakening the U.S. that remains
as a “leading security provider in the region”.50
Because the tensions between China and some of its southern neighbours
were rising in the last years, especially in the South China Sea, the U.S. is treated
as a welcome guest at the high table of international politics in East Asia.51 In
the South China Sea, the U.S. position on the territorial disputes was neutral for
a long time.52 But nowadays, the U.S. has emphasised its interest in “ensuring
freedom of navigation as well as in the peaceful settlement of China’s disputes
with its southern neighbour states”.53 Thereby, the traditional balancing of
power by military forces of the U.S. and Japan is replaced partly by “soft-
balancing”, in particular, by internationalisation and legalisation to preserve
their interests in the South China Sea.54
The main ally of the U.S. in Southeast Asian issues is Japan. After WWII and
especially in the 1970s Japan managed to secure its access to the natural
resources of the region. Main geopolitical instruments were official development
aid programmes and FDI activities. In this way, ASEAN countries became
Japan’s main energy resource providers.55 Also nowadays, there are several
positive outcomes for Shinzo Abe and his successors setting priority in
Southeast Asia: First, the positive economic development in ASEAN, in
48 Haacke 2012: 55.
49 Office 2016.
50 Ikenberry 2015: 8.
51 Cox 2012: 15.
52 Zhao 2015a: 171.
53 Majid 2012: 21.
54 Ordaniel 2015: 95.
55 Zhao 2015a: 90.
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particular its growing middle class, opens up attractive markets for the Japanese
export industries, while low labour costs and improved infrastructure are attract-
ing additional Japanese FDI. Secondly, overseas development assistance and
OFDI are seen as a possibility to limit the current Chinese economic pervasion of
Southeast Asia. And third, Japanese efforts to improve the authority of Southeast
Asian navies in the region should help to establish a smoother balance of
maritime power in the South China Sea.56 In particular, free navigation in the
South China Sea as well as through the Strait of Malacca is of highest impor-
tance for Japan because also Japan’s oil supply and a lot of its products have to
cross them. Therefore, Japan fears a possible domination of this important trade
route and choke points by China.57 Additionally, Japan remains as a main
foreign investor in several Southeast Asian countries as well as an important
customer of natural resources, first of all energy, from the region. For Japan,
there also exists a linkage of the South China Sea dispute to its own East Asia
Sea dispute with China because Beijing’s strategy and actions towards the
claimant states in the South China Sea may have implications for the Japanese-
Chinese dispute in the East China Sea, too.58 But Japan is not an independent
player in the new “Great Game”. As an ally of the U.S., Japan is expected to
support the stance of Washington in matters of security.
For many ASEAN countries India is also a potential compensating power
against the fast-emerging China. So, beside strong relations to Myanmar India
improved relations in particular to Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand. With the
latter countries India signed so-called “Economic Cooperation Agreements”.
These resulted in India becoming a Sectoral Dialogue Partner with ASEAN in
1992 and a full Dialogue Partner in 1995. An ASEAN Regional Forum
Membership was offered to the country in 1996. Additionally, India and
ASEAN are summit partners since 2002. As a consequence, India-ASEAN trade
as well as the flow of FDI are on the rise. Due to defence cooperation, New Delhi
has realised a lot of activities like security dialogues, joint exercises, training,
and visits on high levels. In particular, the cooperation of the navies of India and
Singapore has strengthened. Additionally, India has established a Far Eastern
Naval Command on the Andaman and Nicobar islands. In this way, India is able
to participate in the control over the Strait of Malacca. Additionally, driven by
common interests, India and the U.S. have started to cooperate more intensely in
managing security of the region.59 As a result, India has played a key role in the
56 Mazza 2015.
57 Ordaniel 2015: 100.
58 Zhao 2014: 14.
59 Naidu 2013: 64–67.
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emerging balance of power in Southeast Asia during the last years. In sum,
however, it is the main goal of all other geopolitical players in the region to
curtail the hegemonic rise of China as a great power in Southeast Asia and as a
new maritime power in the South China Sea in particular.
3 Economic relations between China and
Southeast Asia
3.1 China as Foreign direct investor
As Feldstein (2000)60 notes, there are a lot of gains to host countries from FDI:
First, FDI allows transferring technology into less developed countries.
Secondly, receiving countries of FDI often gain employee training as a by-
product of the new businesses’ operation. This contributes to the development
of a local human capital. And third, the profits generated by the FDI help to rise
corporate tax revenues in the host country. But perhaps there are disadvantages
as well. FDI is not only a transfer of ownership from domestic residents to
foreign investors but also a mechanism that enables the latter to exercise
management and thus control over enterprises of the host country – and in an
extreme case over whole countries.
While China was a recipient of FDI in the past, China’s OFDI flows and
stocks nowadays are becoming more and more relevant. Between 2005 and 2015
the FDI inflows into ASEAN from China and South Korea showed the highest
annual growth rates, at 33.4% and 30.3% respectively.61 But FDI flows from
China are not overwhelming within ASEAN. Instead, intra-ASEAN, Japanese, EU-
28, and U.S. FDI flows between 2013 and 2016 were dominating the region, as
Table 1 shows. China was only able to overtake South Korea as the fifth largest
investor in ASEAN by 2015. Whether China’s economic growth and expansion of
investment ties to ASEAN indeed leads to a shift in economic relationships as
postulated by Ikenberry (2015)62 needs to be scrutinised. FDI flows reflect only a
short term picture. Long term dependencies have to be measured by FDI stocks.
In contrast to FDI flows, FDI stocks mirror the cumulated influence of an
investing country in a host society. Because in ASEAN four major foreign
60 Feldstein 2000: 2.
61 Das 2017: 4.
62 Ikenberry 2015: 10.
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investors are relevant (U.S., Japan, EU, China and Hong Kong) a majority of
more than 30% of FDI stocks in a country shall be defined as dependency, while
a percentage between 20 and 30 may be considered as less dependent.
Furthermore, Table 2 shows that FDI are on the rise in all ASEAN countries
in the last years. Between 2008 and 2015, FDI stocks in the region are rising
enormously. For instance, in Brunei Darussalam, Singapore or Thailand they
have doubled. In a few countries they multiplied three times or more, e. g. in
Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, and the Philippines. In 2015, the FDI stocks of the
top three foreign investors in ASEAN countries were the EU (16.7%), Japan
(14.5%), and the U.S. (11.3%), while China accounted only for 6.8%, South
Korea even for no more than 4.7%. At the same time 18.4% of all FDI in ASEAN
countries came from other ASEAN countries.63 While remaining on a low level,
China is becoming an outbound investor in Southeast Asia at huge speed. Its
OFDI to ASEAN countries rose from USD 3,953 million in 2008 to USD 62,715
million in 2015.64 Therefore, the FDI portfolio for the region as a whole is still
very diverse. At the moment, there is no single dominant source economy in
ASEAN,65 but the pattern of Chinese activities is obvious. A few countries in
Southeast Asia could be dominated by China in terms of FDI. Following the data
of the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China (MOFCOM)
Chinese OFDI vary from 1.20% of overall FDI in the Philippines to 85.55% in
Laos.66 But this is only a part of the whole picture.
Of course, FDI data are not always complete and correct. First, IMF, UNCTAD
and MOFCOM data sometimes do not really match each other because of different
accounting practices as well as delayed collection of data. For instance, FDI
Table 1: FDI inflows to ASEAN 2013–2016 by main investor countries (mill. USD).
   
Intra-ASEAN , , , ,
China , , , ,
EU- , , , ,
India , ,  ,
Japan , , , ,
Rep. of Korea , , , ,
USA , , , ,
Source of data: ASEAN (2017): 4.
63 ASEAN 2016b.
64 MOFCOM [Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China] 2016: 149.
65 Cook/Nair 2015: 2.
66 See Table 2.
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estimates for Laos byUNCTAD combinedwithMOFCOMdata yield an overwhelming
99.82% of Chinese OFDI stocks,67 which in view of obvious Thai, Singaporean and
South Korean OFDI of considerable relevance seems unrealistic. Obtaining accurate
data on FDI – in particular in LDCs – therefore is notoriously difficult while Chinese
sources can be expected as generally more accurate.68 Therefore, the real data can
differ in detail from the estimates presented here. Second, as Garcia-Herrero et al.
(2015) are pointing out, Chinese OFDI statistics from MOFCOM have to be adjusted
by two major potential sources of interception, namely offshoring and round-trip-
ping. In particular, HongKong is of utmost importance because FDI fromHong Kong
can also be considered as coming from China, at least to a relevant degree. In
contrast, Singapore is channelling FDI mainly from developed countries like the
EU and the U.S.69 Therefore, OFDI from Hong Kong also have to be taken into
consideration here. See Table 2 or Figure 1.
On the whole, three levels of dependence from China by FDI can be observed.
First, Laos is strongly depending on FDI from China with about 85% of FDI stocks
in 2015. According to Salidjanova/Koch-Weser (2015) Chinese FDI stocks in 2012












BR CA IN LA ML MY PH SI TH VN
Hong Kong
PR China
Figure 1: Chinese and Hong Kong’s OFDI Stocks in percent of FDI Stocks (2015).
Source: Own calculations.
67 UNCTAD 2016: 201.
68 Oh/Andrews-Speed 2015: 8.
69 Das 2017: 4.
70 Salidjanova/Koch-Weser 2015: 36–38.
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accounted for Chinese OFDI with 24.94% and 20.80% respectively. FDI stocks
from Hong Kong in Myanmar are estimated by 15.50% for 2012 e. g.71 making
Myanmar also dependent from China in terms of FDI. In all other countries of the
ASEAN the Chinese share in overall FDI stocks is clearly less than 5%.
What makes OFDI from China more problematic than those from other
countries is the strong ties of investors with the Chinese state and communist
party. China invests first and foremost in resource supply and infrastructure
provided by SOEs. Additionally, the country deploys diplomacy initiatives, sub-
sidies and developmental aid to support its SOEs. From a geopolitical perspec-
tive, this renders its FDI strategic, if not “mercantilist”.72 By means of OFDI
Chinese policy-makers promote the expansion of Chinese markets, the supply of
industrial raw materials and resources, particularly energy resources like oil and
gas for the industrial development of the domestic market, and the acquisition
of much-needed technological assets and managerial know-how.73
3.2 China as trade partner
Growing trade relations can be interpreted in terms of an integration of regions
and countries. On the one hand, such an integration process fosters peace and
cooperation, while, on the other hand, it can also be a threat to the weaker
partners because of a growing dependence from one large trade partner. As
Hirschman (1969 [1945]) has already pointed out, trade can be used as a political
tool when smaller states find themselves in a dependent trade relation with a
larger state.74 As a result of the Asian financial crisis in 1997 several regional
initiatives linking China and Southeast Asian states have been fostered, e. g.
ASEAN+ 3. The free trade agreement between ASEAN and China, ACFTA, is the
most important case in point. The plan for its establishment has been first
suggested by China in 2001. Then, between 2005 and 2010, the six ASEAN
founding members and China agreed to cut down to zero the tariffs for several
products. On 1 January 2010 the ACFTA was then formally established and in
2015 the zero-tariff implementation was expanded to the less developed ASEAN
members.75 For China, Southeast Asia is important not only as a market for its
own commodities, but, in particular, as a supplier of natural resources like
71 Lee 2013c: 9.
72 Zhao 2015a: 79.
73 Das 2014: 6.
74 Hirschman 1969 [1945]: 18–26.
75 Truong 2015: 124.
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Liquide Natural Gas (LNG). ASEAN countries produce about 40% of the whole
world’s supply of LNG.76
But is China able to dominate the trade of the whole region or at least
several countries and to use this power for political purposes? As Fuchs/Klann
(2013) show, appointments of political leaders of Chinese trading partners with
the Dalai Lama worsened the relationship to the People’s Republic during Hu
Jintao’s presidency, resulting in a decrease of trade. Likewise, China in early
2017 penalised South Korea for the installation of the U.S. missile-defence
system THAAD by restraining South Korea’s Lotte Marts in China.77 However,
as Wang (2015) points out, China itself also relies on the products exported by its
trade partners in Southeast Asia and on their demand for its own products. But
while he found that the South China Sea dispute between China and the
Philippines “deteriorated the bilateral trade”,78 he also states that “China is
not a trade power yet”.79 As Wang is a Beijing-based Chinese scholar, this
may illustrate the difference in perspective between China and other countries
when it comes to China’s economic power in Southeast Asia.
However, while the U.S. used to be the leading trade partner of most of the
countries in the region, the People’s Republic of China has gradually become the
biggest and most crucial trade partner of almost all ASEAN economies.80 In
2015, about 76% of ASEAN trade was with countries outside the bloc. While
China with 14.5% was the largest individual trading partner of ASEAN, the EU-
28 accounted for 9.8%, Japan for 9.1%, and the U.S. for 8.4%. While South
Korea with 5.2% is also an important trade partner, India lags behind with only
2.7%.81
But the definition of trade dependency rests on two conditions: First, any
trade fallout must hit one country more than the other. Because of China’s
extremely large market this may apply for all Southeast Asian countries.
However, the second condition is trade imbalance, i. e. the weaker country has
to depend on its main trade partner without a valuable alternative. As Table 3
shows, in 2015 China was among the first three trade partners of all ASEAN
countries, with the only exemption of Brunei Darussalam. To complete the
picture, trade data have to be adjusted by including trade via Hong Kong as
well. In order to simplify our analysis, we can define dependency in analogy to
76 Zhao 2015a: 92.
77 Das 2017: 2.
78 Wang 2015: 109.
79 Wang 2015: 110.
80 Ikenberry 2015: 11.
81 ASEAN 2016a: 15.
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Table 3: Top trade partners and trade volume in 2014/15.
Top Export Partners Top Import Partners Trade Volume
top partners and trade in… top partners and trade in … (Exports + Imports) top
partners and trade in%
partner USD mil. % partner USD mil. % partner %
BR** Japan , .% Malaysia  .% Japan > .%
Korea, Rep. , .% Singapore  .% Korea, Rep. .%
India  .% China  .% … …
Korea, Rep.  .% China >.%
CA** Hong Kong , .% China , .% China > .%
U.S. , .% Thailand , .% Hong Kong .%
Singapore , .% Vietnam , .% U.S. >.%
Hong Kong , .%
IN** Japan , ,% China , .% China .%
China , .% Singapore , .% Singapore .%
Singapore , .% Japan , .% Japan .%
LA* Thailand ~  .% Thailand ~ , .% Thailand .%
China ~  .% China ~  .% China .%
Vietnam ~  .% Vietnam ~  .% Vietnam .%
ML* Singapore , .% China , .% China .%
China , .% Singapore , .% Singapore .%
Japan , .% U.S. , .% U.S. .%
MY*** Thailand , .% China , .% Thailand .%
Hong Kong , .% Singapore , .% Hong Kong .%
India  .% Thailand  .% China .%
PH* Japan , .% China , .% Japan .%
U.S. , .% U.S. , .% China .%
China , .% Japan , .% U.S. .%
Hong Kong >.%
SI* China , .% China , .% China .%
Hong Kong , .% U.S. , .% Malaysia .%
Malaysia , .% Malaysia , .% U.S. .%
… …
Hong Kong .%
TH* U.S. , .% China , .% China .%
China , .% Japan , .% Japan .%
Japan , .% U.S. , .% U.S. .%
VN ** U.S. , .% China , .% China .%
China , .% Korea, Rep. , .% Korea, Rep. .%
Japan , .% Japan , .% U.S. >.%
… …
Hong Kong >.%
Source: CIA (2016), The Republic of China Yearbook 2015 (2015), 130–132, World Bank (2016),
and own calculations. [* data for 2015, ** data for 2014, *** data for 2010].
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FDI: A percentage of 30% and more of China and Hong Kong in the share of a
country’s trade volume indicates dependency. Shares between 20 and 30% of
trade volume we shall consider as indicators of minor dependency.
Some authors like Das (2017)82 define trade dependency as more than 15%
of trade (export or import) volume, neglecting that this implies trade depen-
dency from several trade partners at the same time. On this assumption, China
would already be dominating the region by its trade ties. But this does not reflect
the real situation. This paper in contrast distinguishes all three levels of depen-
dency (see Figure 2): First, Cambodia stands out by a very high percentage of
trade relations with China. But this applies mainly to imports while China is less
important for the country’s exports. According to the above-mentioned defini-
tion of trade dependency, Cambodia is the only ASEAN member which is really
depending on China. Singapore, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam also show rela-
tively strong trade ties (between 20 and 30%) with China and Hong Kong. But
while Singapore and Laos are quite large exporters to China, Myanmar and
Vietnam rely on imports from that country. At the same time, Laos and
Myanmar moreover are depending on Thailand as their largest trade partner.
According to our definition of trade dependency, all remaining countries do not
BR CA IN LA ML MY PH SI TH VN
Export Share 0.0 21.8 10.0 27.0 13.0 21.1 10.9 25.2 11.1 9.9
Import Share 9.9 48.1 17.2 18.6 18.9 27.1 16.4 14.2 20.3 29.5













Figure 2: China (and Hong Kong) as Trade Partner, shares in percent of 2015.
Source: Own calculations.
82 Das 2017: 9.
168 Wrobel: Chinese Geopolitics in Southeast Asia
depend on China as a trade partner. For Brunei Darussalam and the Philippines,
Japan is the main trade partner.
3.3 Pattern of Chinese economic activities
FDI data and data on trade relations can be brought together to show a pattern of the
Chinese economic influence in Southeast Asia. They are considered the most impor-
tant economic ties between countries establishing dependencies or maintaining
independencies. The important link between economics and politics is that
Chinese OFDI in Southeast Asia are mostly effectuated by SOEs which have to follow
the CCP’s instructions and that trade can also be cut by the central administration of
the People’s Republic. As has already been shown above, it is well known that China
uses economic coercion to achieve political objectives. Combining FDI and trade
data, four groups of countries in ASEAN can be identified:
1. China’s small neighbour Laos is heavily dominated by Chinese FDI. This
country may be seen as part of a Chinese backyard already.
2. Countries like Cambodia and Myanmar are partly dominated by Chinese FDI
with trade ties to China on different levels.
3. Countries with small Chinese FDIs and different trade ties to China but
mostly strong military or diplomatic ties to the U.S. are Singapore, the
Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia.
4. Brunei Darussalam has insignificant trade ties with China and a low level of
Chinese FDI.
Of course, our analysis has neglected a third economic dimension: China’s eco-
nomic aid and loans. It is expected that China’s annual expenditures in this domain
is about USD 3 billion only. This is the range of Denmark, Australia or the
Netherlands. But much more money flows in the form of trade credits, training
programmes and infrastructure construction.83 Unfortunately, the Chinese govern-
ment does not publish data sets on this issue. This renders impossiblemore detailed
analyses of this aspect. Data on China’s loans to ASEAN countries are only known in
part. For example, in 2014, the Chinese prime minister promised USD 20 billion to
support connectivity between China and Southeast Asia. This included a USD 10
billion special loan set up by the China Development Bank for regional infrastruc-
ture development.84 The Chinese Eximbank also supports several projects which
83 Shambaugh 2016: 163.
84 Xinhua 2014.
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are in line with China’s new diplomatic strategies, especially including the BRI. In
ASEAN it provided financing for projects like the Kamchay hydropower dam in
Cambodia, the Bac Giang-Lang Son highway and Vin Than coal power plant in
Vietnam. Additionally, multiple dams and transmission systems in Laos as well as
several small projects in Myanmar and Thailand were financed by Eximbank.85 But
at all, the Chinese net official development assistance (ODA) accounted for less than
USD 5 billion per annum in 2014.86 This was four times less than U.S. ODA world-
wide, while both countries spent about one third of the ODA to Asia.87 This shows
the relative importance of Chinese financial activities but does not allow to describe
a concrete regional pattern within ASEAN.
As a main result, Figure 3 shows currently Southeast Asia cannot be called a
Chinese “backyard”, at least not on the basis of economic data like OFDI and
trade ties. Only Laos is heavily relying on China as a foreign investor. Also
Cambodia and Myanmar depend on China in economic terms, although to a
lesser degree. At the moment, all other countries in ASEAN remain largely
independent from China economically. But is this pattern changing?
4 Geopolitical explanations and trends
4.1 Countries (partly) dominated by FDI
Laos: This is one of ASEAN’s smallest and poorest countries. However, between
2003 and 2013, its growth averaged 7.6%, a rate only topped by its neighbour
Cambodia. With 61% of its only 6.8 million inhabitants in the working age Laos
is an attractive destination for labour-intensive manufacturing. Also, tourism
and export has become a main driver of growth. But the trade volume of Laos is
quite small and its trading partners are its immediate neighbours: Thailand,
China and Vietnam.88 While Thailand accounts for nearly half of Laos’s trade
volume, China holds the second place with about 22%.89 Cooperation with
China therefore is important for Laos because the country serves as a stronghold
against Thai domination.90
85 Inclusive Development International 2016: 58.
86 Kitano 2016: 21.
87 Snell 2015: 17–20.
88 Salidjanova/Koch-Weser 2015: 36.
89 See Table 3.
90 Guan 2012: 38.
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China has also been actively competing with Vietnam for Lao allegiance, and in
2010 exceeded Thailand as the largest foreign investor.91 Like this, Laos in terms
of FDI indeed became something like a Chinese backyard. In 2003, Chinese OFDI
accounted for about 1.5% of total FDI in Laos, only.92 But already in 2012,
Chinese OFDI stocks are reckoned with USD 1,928 million or 58.8% of all FDI
stocks in the country. Thailand followed with USD 1,009 million.93 This FDI
dependency according to my calculations rose to about 85% in 2015.94 In 2016,
China accounted for 66% of FDI flows.95 However, the main investors in Laos
are Chinese SOEs as well as large private enterprises. While the former invest
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Figure 3: Chinese and Hong Kong’s OFDI and Trade Volume (in percent).
Source: Own calculations.
91 Guan 2012: 39.
92 Salidjanova/Koch-Weser 2015: 36–38.
93 Cook/Nair 2015: 9–11.
94 See Table 2.
95 ASEAN 2017: 34.
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chosen the casino sector. As a result, the north of Laos has been converted into
extensive rubber plantations as well as huge gambling enclaves which get gains
by a kind of extra-territoriality. For instance, in northern Laos, two important
SEZs are located close to the Chinese border. The “Golden Boten City” and the
“Golden Triangle SEZ” consist of casinos, hotels and other tourism facilities.
Ironically, this is reminiscent of the concessions which were imposed on China
by the western colonial powers in the nineteenth century. But on the other hand,
Chinese capital is also an unexpected opportunity to modernise the country. At
the same time, this also illustrates the overlapping of legal activities like devel-
opment of tourism and illegal practices like prostitution, gambling or drug
money-laundering. Both help Laos to reduce poverty. Additionally, the ruling
Lao Communist Party may consider economic cooperation with China as an
alternative to the anti-opium aid programmes of the United Nations which are
connected with hopes of a democratic opening.96
China has also offered additional support to Laos. In 2013, China provided
the country USD 49 million grant aid and a USD 32.6 million in interest-free
loans.97 In this way, China has become Laos’s primary supplier of economic
assistance, financing a huge number of energy-related infrastructure, agricul-
tural and other development projects.98 Additionally, in 2016 Chinese Norinco
and Sinomach invested USD 2,750 billion into Electricité du Laos.99 Also, several
railway connections are either planned or already under construction. Because
both countries are ruled by communist parties, political relations between them
are strong. China must be seen as a counterweight to the neighbours Thailand
and Vietnam which dominated the country in the past.
Cambodia and Myanmar: These two countries belong to the group of low-
income economies in Southeast Asia.100 But Cambodian economy averaged 8%
growth per year from 2003 through 2012, one of the highest rates within ASEAN.
Main drivers of growth here were tourism to Angkor and the garment industry.
Textile industry-related products constitute around 70% of Cambodia’s exports.
Additionally, the government depends on foreign aid donors for more than half
of its annual fiscal budget.101
As a consequence, trade is very imbalanced. While Hong Kong and the U.S.
are the main export destinations, China primarily due to textile shipments is
96 Tan 2015: 12–17.
97 Salidjanova/Koch-Weser 2015: 36–38.
98 Zhao 2015a: 98.
99 AEI 2016.
100 World Bank 2016.
101 Salidjanova/Koch-Weser 2015: 34.
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dominating the imports with nearly 40%. Hong Kong accounts for additional
8.8%.102 Therefore, Cambodia is suffering from a continuously growing trade
deficit with China. Because of its underdeveloped infrastructure, low capacity
technologies and a modest pool of talents and funds Cambodia’s attraction of
FDI is poor.103 Accordingly, Chinese OFDI stocks in Cambodia amount to some
25%.104 In the last years, Chinese companies were the largest manufacturing
investors, responsible for about 46% of FDI into this sector, in particular
garment industry. Additionally, investments in agriculture activities in
Cambodia are dominated by Vietnam while Malaysia is a significant investor
in finance.105 But Chinese OFDI flows remain on a high level. In 2015 and 2016
Chinese and Hong Kong’s OFDI to Cambodia together accounted for 40 respec-
tive 33%. In comparison, the FDI flows from Japan and the EU were rather small
with only 9% and 8% in 2016 respectively.106
Already during the Vietnam War the Cambodian government under
Sihanouk turned to China which had endorsed the country’s policy of “strict
neutrality”. After a disruption by the takeover of U.S. backed General Lon Nol
due to the victory of Khmer Rouge in 1975, the country until the Vietnamese
occupation in 1979 moved into the orbit of its Chinese donors. After regaining
independence in 1989, China resumed ties with the restored kingdom.
Nowadays, China serves Cambodia’s interest as a bulwark against Vietnamese
or Thai hegemony.107 Therefore, Cambodia is also cooperating with China in
military issues nowadays. For instance, in 2003 both countries signed a memor-
andum of defence cooperation stipulating China’s support in developing a
Cambodian military airfield and in building barracks as well as officer’s quar-
ters. In return, China backs Cambodia with several loans and developmental
aid.108 As a result, China today is not only one of Cambodia’s top foreign
investors but also the country’s main aid donor.109 Therefore, Cambodia leans
towards China also politically, e. g. in the South China Sea dispute.110
Similarly to Laos and Cambodia, the size of FDI stocks and the annual
inflow in Myanmar are also very small.111 Nevertheless, Myanmar is at least
102 See Table 3.
103 Jalilian 2013: 125–126.
104 See Table 2.
105 ASEAN 2015: 11.
106 ASEAN 2017: 31.
107 Guan 2012: 37–38.
108 Salidjanova/Koch-Weser 2015: 34–36.
109 Zhao 2015a: 98.
110 Zhao 2014: 13.
111 Cook/Nair 2015: 4.
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partly depending on Chinese FDI, too. Already during the political isolation
under the military regime opportunities for China’s policymakers have been
opened up in Myanmar. China supported the “rogue regime” by giving it inter-
national recognition as well as financial support through FDIs and developmen-
tal aid. Conversely, Myanmar had to allow China to secure oil and gas
exploration contracts, building deep sea ports and pipelines.112 In contrast, the
democratisation of Myanmar has been an important goal of U.S. policy under all
recent administrations. Under president Obama, dialogue became a significant
complement to sanctions.113 As a low-income country, Myanmar is characterised
by a lack of industrial development. Additionally, trade is not so important for
Myanmar’s economy. The trade-to-GDP ratio accounts for less than 50%. The
country runs a huge trade deficit and relies on two regional trading partners,
Thailand and China.114 While Thailand is Myanmar’s largest export partner with
a share of about 42%, China is the leading import partner with more than 27%.
Thailand, China and Hong Kong together account for more than 58% of
Myanmar’s trade volume.115 Also Chinese OFDI to Myanmar have been rising
for several years. From 2004 to 2012, the amount of Chinese OFDI in Myanmar
increased from USD 4.1 million to USD 749 million.116 In particular, Chinese
SOEs have invested intensively in large-scale infrastructure projects. The corner-
stone of the Chinese FDIs is a common pipeline project with the main purpose to
transport oil and gas from the Middle East and Africa from the Indian Ocean
directly to China by circumventing the Strait of Malacca. It was put into opera-
tion in 2013.117 But the project has encouraged a number of obstacles like
tensions between Chinese and Burmese workers or resistance from local com-
munities which feel insufficiently reimbursed for their land. Additionally, in 2011
the construction of a Chinese backed hydropower dam as well as a joint copper-
mine project had to be halted because of opposition by local Burmese.118
The loosening and reduction of Western sanctions since the elections in
Myanmar 2010 induced a greater diversity in FDI, i. e. China – the main player
since 2005 – is only one among several foreign stakeholders in the country. As a
consequence, Myanmar is not reliant on countries like China and Russia for
strategical support anymore.119 According to data of IMF and MOFCOM, the
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stock of Chinese OFDI in Myanmar thus accounted for only 20.80% in 2015. But
if one adds the roughly 15.50% FDI from Hong Kong, Myanmar is still domi-
nated by Chinese FDI today,120 although dependency is decreasing. In 2015 and
2016 Chinese and Hong Kong’s OFDI to Myanmar accounted for only 8% and
12% respectively, while intra-ASEAN FDI flows with 73% respective 56% were
overwhelming.121 Therefore, Myanmar due to its stronger position is now able to
claim re-negotiation of conditions that were agreed on under less favourable
circumstances.122
It is obvious that Myanmar has to balance the economic power of its neigh-
bours Thailand and China. But Myanmar is also of strategical interest for India
which finances several infrastructure projects in the country.123 The particular
strategic importance of Myanmar lies in its ability to open access to the Indian
Ocean both for China and India’s Northeast. In this context, Beijing apparently
hopes to achieve its longer-term objective to develop a naval presence in this
world region.124 In view of these circumstances, it is not surprising that in the past
Myanmar leant towards China also politically, e. g. in the South China Sea
dispute.125 Yet, Myanmar’s development into a democracy has not only brought
along a shift in geopolitical positions, but also in the balance of power.
4.2 Independent countries with different trade ties
Singapore: Since Sir Stamford Raffles incorporated Singapore into the orbit of the
British East India Company in 1819, the city has been a society of multi-cultural
immigrants. Singaporeans have mainly Chinese (74%), Malay (13%) and Indian
(9%) ethnic background. But from the beginning of independence in the 1960s,
the predominantly Chinese leadership of Singapore introduced policies to estab-
lish a Singaporean identity. To foster multiculturalism and to create an interna-
tionally competitive labour force, the government has chosen English as the
primary language in the education system. But despite the Hokkien background
of most of Singaporean Chinese it also started a “Speak Mandarin” campaign in
1979. Therefore, Singapore’s language selection is telling of the country’s prag-
matism and balancing of Chinese and English speaking markets.126
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Singapore heavily relies on commerce with a trade-to-GDP ratio of about
300%. At the same time, it is one of the largest trading centres in the world.
Additionally, the city is an important transit site for energy shipments from
Africa or the Middle East to Northeast Asia.127 Nevertheless, Singapore’s finan-
cial sector is of highest importance for the development of the country.128
Singapore optimises its economic opportunities by growing market ties with
China on the one hand and by robust diplomatic, military and economic rela-
tions to the U.S. on the other. In this way, the country can balance its cultural,
spatial and economic links to China all by keeping its independence.129 With
regard to Chinese FDI the city-state is an outlier in ASEAN. But unlike other
ASEAN states, Singapore is also a substantial investor in China. For instance,
between 2003 and 2013 cumulative Singapore’s FDI in China accounted for USD
44 billion or 41% of ASEAN OFDI in China. Additionally, Singapore was one of
the first countries to sign a bilateral FTA with China in 2008. Therefore, China
today is the country’s largest import and export partner, accounting for 14.0% of
Singapore’s trade volume.130 The city state is also collaborating with China on
several infrastructure projects.131 But Singapore’s status as one of the world’s
leading financial centres is preventing the country from being over-reliant from
any financial partner. Chinese OFDI stocks in Singapore accounted for more
than USD 31 billion in 2015. This represents only 3.27% of all OFDI stocks.132
Singapore thus is certainly not over-reliant on China.133
On the other hand, military ties to the U.S. are stronger than to China.
Although Singapore is not an official ally of the U.S., it is an important partner
for the U.S. in security issues in Southeast Asia. In 2005, the defence relation-
ship between both countries was formalised with the Strategic Framework
Agreement (SFA), which expanded the focus of cooperation in several areas
like counterterrorism. The agreement also allows the U.S. access to several
Singaporean military facilities.134 Singapore signed also a FTA with the U.S. in
2004. However, Singaporeans don’t want to become a satellite, be it China or
any other great power.135 All in all, one can say that Singapore is very successful
in balancing the Great Powers to keep its independence.
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The Philippines and Vietnam: Due to their common struggle against China’s
efforts to expand its sphere of influence in the South China Sea, the Philippines and
Vietnam appear to be “natural allies”.136 This sea has been an important shipping
lane for several centuries. Additionally, its rich fish resources have provided liveli-
hood for the surrounding countries. However, the discovery of huge oil and gas
reserves sinceWorldWar II is provoking new geopolitical conflicts.137 The countries
in Southeast Asia have focussed on economic development and cooperation also
with China, and those among them who are refuting China’s claims in the South
China Sea attempt to avoid any escalation of this dispute into an open conflict.
Therefore, as early as in 2002 ASEAN countries and China signed a “Declaration on
the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea”. But after more than 10 years no
detailed code of conduct for maritime activities in the disputed area has been
agreed upon. In recent years, China’s policy was characterised by increasing
military activities and deliberate provocations of its southern neighbours. This
may result from the CCP facing pressure from rising nationalism in its own country,
as Zhao (2014) points out.138 The U.S. “Pivot” of 2011 has resulted in amore assertive
attitude of some claimant states– in particular the Philippines andVietnam.139 Both
countries approve of U.S. activities in East Asia.140
The Philippines are economically less important for China than politically.
Chinese FDI is on a small level (1.2%) and Japan remains the Philippines’s largest
trade partner, followed by China and the U.S.141 But Chinese-Philippine economic
and trade relations are suffering from the South China Sea disputes.142 Maritime
territorial disputes are a key source of bilateral tensions.143 In contrast to other
ASEAN countries, the Philippines have not been very active in signing FTAs either
with China or with other countries.144 In addition, the colonial past of the
Philippines has strengthened the ties with the U.S., not least due to a felt cultural
affinity. For instance, most Filipinos are fluent in English. Economically, U.S.
influence in the Philippines is supported by the presence of the Washington-
based World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. Besides Japan, the U.S. is
the largest shareholder of the latter.145 Eventually, the Philippines have the oldest
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U.S. defence relationship in East Asia. The country was wrested from the Spanish
crown as a result of the Spanish-American War in 1898. In 1946, the archipelago
was granted independence. Until the end of the Cold War, the largest U.S. military
bases in the Pacific Ocean were located in the Philippines. In 1991, a successor to
the “Military Bases Agreement”was rejected by the Philippine government compel-
ling American withdrawal from its territory. But in spite of the closing of the U.S.
bases, U.S.-Philippine military relations remained extensive to the present day. In
2014, the U.S. and the Philippines announced a new “Enhanced Defence
Cooperation Agreement” (EDCA) allowing an expanded U.S. presence in the
Philippines. Especially, the growing tensions in the South China Sea have led to a
sustained perception in the Philippines that the country is in need of support by and
closer cooperation with the U.S.146
On the other hand, Filipino business elites are predominantly of Chinese
pedigree. It is all the more remarkable that China has been unable to translate
this historical influence into more substantial economic and political relations.
As opinion polls show, the Filipinos are more likely to distrust than to trust
China, a tendency which reflects the territorial disputes in the South China
Sea.147 Nonetheless, the political situation may change in the near future, and
the truest ally of the U.S. in East Asia may swing to the “Chinese side”, since
president Rodrigo Duterte is leaning towards China. For instance, the
Philippines accepted USD 24 billion developmental aid from China In 2016.148
The second country with substantial maritime sea disputes with China is
Vietnam. The Chinese OFDI stock here accounted for less than 3.3% in 2015. But
the country’s trade with China is very imbalanced. While the U.S. remain
Vietnam’s main export partner (19.1%) followed by China (9.9%), imports
from China with 29.5% are overwhelming.149 Both countries have Socialist
Market Economies and they share deep rooted historical and cultural relations.
On the other hand, Vietnam wants to avoid the impression that the country is
becoming reliant on the Chinese economy. The diplomatic relationship has
suffered – like in the case of the Philippines – from China’s aggressive behaviour
in the South China Sea as well as from memories of the 1979 Chinese-Vietnamese
War.150 Thus, in May 2014, when China placed its giant oil rig “Haiyang Shiyou
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981” in what Vietnam considers its Exclusive Economic Zone, this provoked a
diplomatic crisis until China withdrew its oil rig.151 It thus seems that Vietnam
has the most problematic relations with China and in spite of its history tends to
consider the U.S. as a countervailing force against Beijing.152 Thus, in 2011 the
two countries concluded their first military agreement since the Vietnam War
and military cooperation is gradually deepening.153 But Vietnam, which tradi-
tionally considers China as a security threat, has endorsed a policy of “Three
No’s Principles”: “no military alliance, no foreign base on Vietnam’s soil, and no
relationship with one country against a third country”.154 Vietnam thus will most
probably never become an U.S. ally like the Philippines, particularly, because of
the country’s war experience, but also due to fears of U.S. “plots of peaceful
evolution” to democracy. At the same time, the country has to look for an ally
outside ASEAN, and the U.S. might be an option for Vietnam.155 At large, both
countries are supported in their territorial claims by the U.S. and Japan which
want to prevent the rise of China’s maritime power in the region.
Indonesia and Malaysia: In the Muslim states of Southeast Asia, Malaysia
and Indonesia, where Chinese minorities are economically successful, anti-
Chinese sentiments are strong. This was officially institutionalised with the
“Benteng” (fortress) policy in Indonesia in the early 1950s and the New
Economic Policy (NEP) in Malaysia from 1971 with the declared intention of
achieving economic parity between the politically dominant Malays and the
economically omnipresent Chinese.156 Therefore, both states are cautious in
building up closer relations to China without balancing them.
Indonesia is the country with the largest population and economy in
ASEAN. However, the country remains relatively poor. With 43%, its trade-to-
GDP ratio is one of the lowest in ASEAN.157 During the Cold War the Chinese-
Indonesian relations were characterised as a “pathological Sinophobia” because
of the distrust in Indonesia’s own ethnic Chinese citizens but also because of the
fear from communist China.158 It was a clear strategic calculation by Suharto not
to normalise Indonesia’s relations with China. Since the 1990s, the relations
between both nations have improved drastically. But Indonesia keeps a distance
to China in terms of economic diplomacy. The country has signed no FTA with
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China, but with its wealthier neighbours Japan and South Korea.159 On the other
hand, Chinese FDI in Indonesia was rising to a stock of USD 8.125 billion in
2015.160 Additionally, China became an important lender to Indonesia. The
country is also one of China’s top energy and raw material suppliers, such as
LNG, coal, nickel, bauxite, and iron core. In particular, Indonesia’s LNG produc-
tion is the third largest in the world, after Qatar and Malaysia. Also for other raw
materials China is highly dependent from Indonesia.161 Simultaneously, Japan
remains Indonesia’s largest export partner. But with 13.6%, China is the largest
trade partner, while Chinese FDI at the same time is on a low level.162
For most Indonesian elites, ASEAN constitutes the main area of interest in
Indonesia’s foreign relations. Stability, security, and prosperity of Southeast
Asia are Indonesia’s core strategic goals. This was already set out in the political
principle of “bebas aktif” (free and active) in 1948 which demanded that
Indonesia does not take sides in any rivalry between great powers. To balance
China’s influence, Indonesia is forging a closer relationship to the U.S. under a
Comprehensive Partnership Agreement.163 Indonesia perceives itself as the lea-
der of the region.164 But Indonesia’s president Widodo’s goal to revive the
country’s position as a maritime power at the axis of Indian and Pacific Ocean
provides China great opportunities for future cooperation, in particular in the
framework of China’s “Maritime Silk Road” approach. Therefore, there are
indications that Indonesia under president Widodo is approaching China.165
On the other hand, Indonesia came into conflict with China because of the
maritime disputes in the South China Sea in 2016. The main apple of discord
are fishery rights in the waters surrounding the Indonesian island of Natuna.166
While the country remains economically weak domestically, it is large and
powerful enough to resist strategic demands of foreign powers.
Quite similar is Malaysia’s geopolitical position. The country’s strategic
geographic location in Southeast Asia has eased its trade relations between
the East and the West through the Strait of Malacca – already since the time
of the Malacca Sultanate in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. In contrast to
Indonesia, the Malaysian economy performed well in the last years. As a result,
Malaysia as the only ASEAN member state except Singapore and Brunei has
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achieved the upper-middle-income status.167 With a trade-to-GDP ratio of over
150%, international trade has a relevant share in Malaysia’s success.168
Especially, export of LNG is of utmost importance.169 But Malaysia’s trade
structure is not dominated by any single partner. Indeed, China is the country’s
second large export partner and largest import partner, but Singapore is on a
similar level, followed by Japan and the U.S.170 Therefore, Malaysian trade is
balanced among trade partners. For years, Malaysia was an ASEAN member
state that invested more in the People’s Republic of China than China invested in
Malaysia. Even today, Chinese FDI stock in the country with 1.90% is even
smaller than in Indonesia.171
But in Malaysia China is considered a promising and trustful partner.172
Quite similar to Indonesia, Malaysia is calling for a “neutralisation” of
Southeast Asia. Therefore, the country proposed a “Zone of Peace, Freedom
and Neutrality” (ZOPFAN). This initiative requires that no major powers have
significant political or military presence in the region. This is somewhat different
from Singapore’s approach, which accepts the presence of both the U.S. and
China considering them as stabilising powers balancing each other. However,
Malaysia has not been averse to joint military exercises with the U.S.
Additionally, it also offers the U.S. military access to its airfields and ports.
While Malaysia at the same time is also claiming a number of reefs in the South
China Sea, the country and China have agreed on peacefully continuing nego-
tiations over all territorial disputes.173 This strategy may be the result of the
ethnical division of the Malaysian population: While some Islamist groups in the
dominant United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) party are reluctant to
appear too close to the U.S., many of the pro-business ethnic Chinese commu-
nity are forging strong business relations to China.174 Therefore, Malaysia has
invested much care in promoting its image as a neutral broker in Southeast Asia.
In sum, both countries – Indonesia and Malaysia – are cautious about the U.S.
involvement in the South China Sea dispute.175
Thailand: The Kingdom of Siam – as Thailand was known in the nineteenth
century – maintained its sovereignty also during the whole period of European
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colonialization in Southeast Asia. After World War II the royal regime felt threa-
tened by communism and feared regional instability. Therefore, Thailand as early
as in 1954 joined the Philippines as a founding member of the now defunct U.S.
led South East Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO). Additionally, Thailand was
also founding member of ASEAN.176 Thailand thus is one of the first U.S. allies in
Southeast Asia. The country’s central location in mainland Southeast Asia has
made it an important cornerstone of U.S. alliances in East Asia, especially during
the Vietnam War. As a result, U.S. and Thai forces conduct regular common
exercises until now. But U.S.-Thai relations became estranged in recent years
due to domestic unrest and several military coups in Thailand.177
Today, Thailand is the second largest economy in ASEAN. In terms of FDI,
the country is entirely independent from China which accounts for less than
2%.178 Obviously, the sectors open to FDI are not corresponding to China’s
strategic interests.179 Like Malaysia, the country is very open to trade with a
trade-to-GDP ratio of about 140%. What makes Thailand unique is its export of
services, especially tourism.180 Thailand’s trade is very balanced. In 2015, the
U.S. were the main export partner of Thailand (11.3%), followed by China
(11.1%) and Japan (9.4%). These three countries are also the leading partners
from which Thailand imported goods.181 But the trade with China is rising
enormously. During the decade of China’s entrance into WTO in 2001 and 2011,
it rose with growth rates of 26.7% per annum.182 Like this, Thailand has also
been shifting towards the People’s Republic of China, especially in economic
terms. But domestic producers have suffered from cheap Chinese manufac-
tured imports, especially in the agricultural sector.183
While Chinese-Thai relations have never been estranged, the deepening of
the current bilateral relationship is mainly fuelled by the Overseas Chinese in
Thailand, who have not only become well-integrated economically but who are
in fact dominating the economic sphere. Military relations also have deepened in
the last years, as China has trained more Thai middle-ranking officers in China.
Additionally, both countries have undertaken joint military exercises since
2003.184 Since 2007, Thai and Chinese military forces realised several joint
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counterterrorism exercises. Since 2010, both marines also have conducted com-
mon exercises.185 All in all, Thailand never viewed China as a source of strategic
instability. Rather, it sees China as a valued and reliable political, economic and
military partner. In view of this, the U.S. pivot to East Asia has been considered
detrimental to Sino-Thai relations.186
In contrast, U.S.-Thai relations worsened, in particular after the military
coup in 2014. The U.S. withheld several millions of USD in military and security
aid to Thailand. Additionally, U.S.-Thai bilateral naval exercises were cancelled.
But while the U.S. demanded democratic elections in Thailand, China remained
silent in this respect. But China still has not replaced the U.S. as Thailand’s most
important cooperation partner. Plans to build a high-speed rail link with
Kunming via the Laotian capital Vientiane by 2021 already collapsed in
2014.187 Currently, China tries to convince Thailand – and Malaysia as well –
to realise the Kra Isthmus canal project. Once completed, the canal will sig-
nificantly reduce transportation time and costs between the Indian and the
Pacific Ocean. Additionally, China will become less dependent on the Strait of
Malacca.188 However, to date the project is still far away from realisation.
While Thailand thus officially remains a political ally of the U.S., economic
and military relations to China are on the rise. Therefore, many commentators
believe that Thailand is slowly but steadily drifting towards China.189 After the
coup of 2014, this process has accelerated. Thailand’s military government is
strengthening military cooperation with China, first by the expansion of joint
exercises, and second by a decision to purchase three submarines from China.190
But as we have shown, both Thailand’s trade and FDI inflow are balanced at the
moment. Therefore, the country still has significant alternatives to China. As a
result of this, the country is neutral in the South China Sea dispute.191 After all, it
thus can be considered a small middle power in Southeast Asia.
Brunei Darussalam: This country has the loosest ties to China within
ASEAN. In 1984 it became independent from the UK. Independence followed
after a civil war which prevented it from joining Malaysia. 15% of the population
are Chinese speaking. Because of its wealth in oil and gas, the country is one of
the richest in ASEAN. For the same reason, it is of strategic importance to China
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because its oil and gas do not have to pass the Strait of Malacca, the bottleneck
of Chinese energy imports. Thus, Brunei became a significant provider of energy
resources to China within the last years. Since 2000, China is Brunei’s eighth
largest purchaser of crude oil.192 However, by 2014 Japan was Brunei’s largest
export partner with a share of 37.2%, followed by South Korea with 11.0% and
India with 9.1%.193 While Chinese FDI in Brunei have increased from USD 6.51
million in 2008 to USD 73.52 million in 2015, the Chinese OFDI stock accounts for
1.21% only.194 While maritime disputes on the Louisa Reef present a challenge to
the bilateral relationship, the sultanate has not occupied any of the claimed
maritime territories. Downplaying the issue, it focuses on multilateral mechan-
isms for dispute resolution.195 All in all, the country seems absolutely indepen-
dent from China.
5 Conclusion
Is Southeast Asia a “backyard” of the People’s Republic of China? Obviously,
not. Or at least: not yet. The region is not secure for Chinese presence, power,
and passage. China neither is in a position to prevent the U.S., the main hostile
foreign power in the region, from acquiring military bases and facilities in
Southeast Asia. At the same time, there is a struggle for a new balance-of-
power in the region. But China is forced to dedicate a lot of military resources
to protecting its interests and assets. This entails that the dual hierarchy as
postulated by Ikenberry (2015) can only be observed in part. Both main powers –
China and the U.S. and its allies – have different levels of economic and military
cooperation within ASEAN members. But while China is not dominating the
entire region economically, military dominance of the U.S. neither remains
stable throughout the whole of South East Asia. All in all, the pattern of
Chinese, but also U.S. and Japanese economic and military activities appears
quite diverse.
But it is obvious that China has taken efforts to dominate ASEAN economic-
ally. The Chinese government especially supports SOEs in investing in several
countries of South East Asia. As a result, additionally to Laos, which is under
Chinese control by OFDI, Cambodia and Myanmar have also been brought under
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partial Chinese control by OFDI. But as states with traditionally good relations to
the People’s Republic, these countries never belonged to the sphere of influence
of the U.S. – the main antagonist of China in South East Asia. These countries
thus offered niches for Chinese investments and products. From a trade per-
spective, only Cambodia is really dependent from imports from China and Hong
Kong which make up for 50% of its trade. Beside Laos and Myanmar, a minor
degree of trade dependency of 20 to 30% can only be observed for Singapore
and Vietnam.
In contrast, the U.S. by its military presence is able to ensure indepen-
dence from China of several states in South East Asia, mainly in the maritime
region. While the Philippines are a long-time ally of the U.S., Singapore and
Thailand try to keep a balance between both competitors. At the same time,
the Philippines, but also the communist party ruled Vietnam, compete with
China for territorial claims in the South China Sea. Both are supported by the
U.S., which insist on free navigation rights in the region. However, the new
president of the Philippines, Duterte, shifts the country gradually towards the
Chinese side. Singapore – with its Chinese speaking majority – is strong and
independent because it has become an important financial hub not only for
the region but on a global scale. Thailand which is controlled economically
by its Chinese minority is also able to dominate Laos in terms of trade. But it
is also influential in Myanmar where it is strongly competing with the
People’s Republic of China. However, since the military coup in 2014 and
the following worsening of the U.S.-Thai relations it can be identified as a
“swing-state”. In contrast, all three Muslim countries of the region, Malaysia,
Indonesia and Brunei Darussalam are absolutely independent from China
both relative to trade and investment. This is especially true for Brunei
which as an oil exporting country can maintain its independence from
China. On this account, Ikenberry’s thesis of two hierarchies seems far too
simple for explaining the political reality in present-day South East Asia.
Obviously, the above described pattern of China’s economic influence and its
military cooperation is also reflected in the attitudes of the various ASEANmembers
in the South China Sea dispute. While Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar – countries
that are economically dependent on China – are leaning toward China, both
Vietnam and the Philippines support the U.S. position. Thailand and Singapore
are neutral, but theMuslim states ofMalaysia and Indonesia are cautious about U.S.
involvement.196 This is a mirror of the economic pattern of dependencies and shows
the political importance of economic ties in geopolitics.
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Finally, China faces a dilemma: If it acts too aggressively, it runs the danger
of pushing the small ASEAN countries into the arms of the U.S. But if it concedes,
other Asian nations will become stronger and bolder in their cooperation with the
U.S. in order to hamper Chinese ambitions in time.197 So far, U.S. presence in
South East Asia from a Chinese point of view can be considered an effort to
encircle and contain China. Despite the fast speed of China’s OFDIs in the region
and its rising importance as a trade partner, the U.S. will stay a balancing military
power in the region, and the same is true for Japan in terms of economic
influence. At the same time, the Trump administration in Washington may fun-
damentally change the U.S. strategy towards East Asia. Trump focuses more on
internal U.S. affairs than on foreign policy because he considers the U.S. suffering
from globalisation. Therefore, his policy is also more protectionist. Consequently,
the U.S. left the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement already in January
2017, leaving behind a large economic diplomacy vacuum in the region.198 The
geopolitical situation in South East Asia thus will become more complex in the
future. We therefore agree with Ikenberry (2015) that there is no simple transition
from American hegemony to Chinese hegemony in ASEAN.199 In contrast, for the
ASEAN countries the current U.S.-Chinese competition for supremacy brings along
an opportunity to balance their own independence, although they may fear that
the withdrawal of the U.S. from the regional “Great Game” will lead to the rise of
China as the sole hegemonic power in the region.
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